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ABSTRACT Risk priority number (RPN) is a widely used approach, and it is a powerful means to assess
the criticality of modes in a failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) worksheet. In the
application of the traditional FMECA, the RPN is determined to rank the failure modes; however, the method
has been criticized several times for having many drawbacks and weaknesses, such as the presence of
gaps in the range of admissible values, the duplicates value provided by different combinations of the
base factors, and the high sensitivity to small changes. This paper analyses and compares some alternative
RPN formulation proposed in the literature to overcome these limits. This paper takes into account only
the alternative RPN, which proposes a powerful solution without increasing the computational complexity
and remaining coherent to the classical idea included in the international standard IEC 60812. In order
to compare the advantages and disadvantages of these alternative RPNs, an FMECA was developed for
a heating, ventilation, and air condition (HVAC) system in railway application. The critical analysis of the
comparison can provide recommendations and suggestions regarding the choice of the alternative RPN based
on the type of application. Finally, this paper takes into account the scales reduction of possible values related
to the parameters (i.e., occurrence, severity, and detection), which influence the assessment of the RPN. This
approach allows the designers to mitigate the drawbacks related to the full scale and provide an easier and
faster assessment of the scores to evaluate the criticality analysis and prioritization.
INDEX TERMS FMECA, railway engineering, reliability theory, risk priority number.
I. INTRODUCTION
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is one of the most
powerful methods used for risk assessment and maintenance
management [1].
FMEA has been used to identify the critical risk events and
predict a system failure to avoid or reduce the potential failure
modes and their effect on operations. FMECA is composed
of two separates analyses, the FailureMode and Effects Anal-
ysis (FMEA) and the Criticality Analysis (CA) [2]. FMEA
includes a list of possible device failuremodes, failure causes,
local and final effects that refers to the impact of each failure
on the system element and the whole system respectively,
and the alternative recommended corrective actions to avoid
each failure. On the other hand, Criticality Analysis plans
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and focuses the maintenance activities according to a set of
priorities by giving failures with the highest risk the highest
priority. More details on FMECA process and application are
given in references [3]–[6]. FMECA is one of the most used
techniques for failure analysis in particular during design
stage of new systems.
This method is an inductive analysis method that starts
from the lowest level (single component) and continues
analyzing the upper hierarchical level. In order to achieve
a priority ranking of the identified failure modes and effect
the second analysis (Criticality Analysis) is performed. This
ranking is obtained using a quantitative index, Risk Priority
Number (RPN), given by themultiplication of the Occurrence
(O), Severity (S) and Detection (D) of a failure [1]–[4], [7]:
RPN = O · S · D (1)
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where [1]:
• Occurrence (O) is the probability that a failure mode will
happen, therefore it is strongly linked to the failure rate
of the equipment.
• Severity (S) defines the strength of failure impact on the
system, it’s related to the effects of the failure modes.
• Detection (D) indicates the possibility of diagnose the
failure mode before its effects are manifested on the
system.
The range of the RPN values depends on the measure-
ment scales for the three parameters. As suggested by
IEC-60812 [4], parameters O, S and D are generally mea-
sured on a 10-point scale wherein greater O and S numbers
stand for increasing values of the frequency of occurrence and
of the severity respectively, whereas D is ranked in a reversers
order, namely the higher the detection value, the lower the
detection probability of the failure mode, producing overall
RPN values ranging from 1 to 1000.
II. DRAWBACKS OF CLASSICAL RPN
The classical RPN formula is very simple and intuitive, but
its use for the criticality analysis of the system/process failure
modes has highlighted many drawbacks [4], [8]–[19]:
• Gaps in the Range: The RPN values are not continuous
but have only a few unique values. If a 10 values scale
is used, 88% of the range is empty; the largest number
is 1000, but 900 is the second largest followed by 810,
800, 729, and 720.
• Duplicate RPNs: Different values of the parameters may
generate identical RPN values. For example, the RPN
numbers 60, 72, and 120 can be formed from 24 different
combinations of S, O, and D. However, the hidden risk
implications of the three events may be very vastly
different because of the different severities of the failure
modes.
• High Sensitivity to Small Changes: Multiplying the
numbers comprising the RPN is intended to magnify the
effects of high-risk factors. For above mention example,
if O and D are both 8, then a 1- point difference in sever-
ity rating results in a 64 quantitative grade difference in
the RPN. It is very evident RPN value varying sensitivity
to small changes.
• Inadequate Scale of RPN, in fact the relative importance
among O, S and D is not taken into consideration. The
three factors are assumed to have the same importance.
This may not be the case when applying to a practical
FMECA. For example, the RPN1 with 3, 4, and 5 as S,
O, and D, respectively, gives the value of 60, whereas
the RPN2 with 3, 5, and 5 gives 75. In fact, in RPN2 the
failure mode has the twice the occurrence, but the RPN
value is not doubled. This explains that the RPN values
cannot be compared linearly.
• O, S, D are defined in very subjective way, in fact the
three factors are difficult to precisely determine. Much
information in FMECA can be expressed in a linguistic
FIGURE 1. Histogram of all the possible values of risk priority number.
way such as moderate, remote or very high. Anyway,
people who express these judgments should presumably
be experts in the field where FMECA is performed,
and these experts represent the most reliable source of
information. In spite of that, expert’ knowledge is often
uncertain and incomplete so that FMECA analysis is to
performed by the support of methods able to properly
manage such uncertainty of input data@perio
• Dispersion of RPNs: All the possible RPN values are
scattered among the full range,in fact there is a high
concentration of multiple value in the left side of the
scale and a low concentration in the right side.
Fig. 1 shows the numbers formed by the RPN and the
relative problems expressed below. The ‘‘holes’’ in the scale
between the numbers, in fact greater part of the numbers are
concentrated in the left side of the scale representing by low
values of RPN, then another problem shown by the figure is
the multiplicity of some values, for example there are 24
different combination for obtaining a specific RPN values.
III. ALTERNATIVE RISK PRIORITY NUMBERS
Several papers propose different approaches to overcome the
limits associated to RPN, described below. Table 1 summa-
rizes the main proposed approaches for each of the individual
problem, the first column contains the drawbacks and the sec-
ond one contains the main methods suggested in literature to
solve them.
The following subparagraphs explain in detail the methods
proposed in literature to overcome the RPN issue included in
table 1.
A. SUM
Braband and Griebel [15] and Braband [16] proposes an
alternative equation for the RPN assessment, using the sum
of the three metrics, called IRPN - Improved Risk Prior-
ity Number. The international standard IEC 60812-2018 [4]
includes the alternative RPN method proposed by Braband
and Griebel [15] and Braband [16] (called ARPN - Alterna-
tive Risk Priority Number - instead of IRPN) as a modified
version of the commonly used RPNwith the aim of providing
a more consistent assessment of criticality when parameters
can be quantified on a logarithmic scale.
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TABLE 1. Possible approaches to solve common RPN issues.
FIGURE 2. Histogram of all the possible values of ARPN (or IRPN).
Equation 2 shows how to assess the Alternative Risk Pri-
ority Number [4], [15], [16]:
ARPN = IRPN = O+ S + D (2)
Considering a [1; 10] range of integer values for the three
parameters O, S and D, Fig. 2 shows the numbers formed by
the IRPN and the relative repetition frequency. The IRPN is
a powerful solution for most the problems explained above
because it results in a continuous scale delating the value
dispersion, as shown in Fig. 2. In fact, IRPN assumes all
the integer values in the interval from 3 to 30, therefore the
IRPN scale has no gaps. Moreover, it solves the sensitivity
problem because small variations in one ranking have the
same effects on the IRPN, independently of the values of the
other factors. Despite these advantages, the problem of the
duplicate IRPNs is highly accentuated, with the maximum
repetition frequency of 75, three times bigger than the classi-
cal RPN. This problem is clearly evident considering that the
FIGURE 3. Histogram of all the possible values of ERPN(3).
percentage number of unique value is only 2.8% comparing
to the 12% of the classical RPN.
B. EXPONENTIAL
Chang et al. [12] proposed an exponential RPN (ERPN)
as eq. 3. In this method, the number of unique values for
risk evaluation of failures has been increased, reducing the
number of duplicates RPNs (Fig. 3).
ERPN (x) = xWS ·S + xWO·O + xWD·D (3)
where x is a positive integer, and x ≥ 2; O, S andD are integer
rating range between 1 and 10; WS ,WO,WD are weights for
severity, occurrence and detection respectively. Chang proved
that the optimal choice is x = 3, leading to 220 different
unique values.
Akbarzade Khorshidi et al. [20] modified the equa-
tion, as the product of occurrence and detection stand as
probability, and severity plays a role as value in power
as (4).
URPN (z) = (O · D) · zS (4)
where z is a real number, and z ≥ 1. According to Khorshidi,
the choice that leads to the maximum number of unique
values is z = e (Fig. 4).
Both ERPN and URPN solve very well the problem of
duplicate RPNs and of different importance between O, S and
D; but they amplify the problems of the ‘‘holes’’ and of the
dispersion because the maximum possible values are respec-
tively 2 and 3 order of magnitude larger than the classical
RPN.
C. CORRECTIVE FACTORS
Several papers [21]–[26] propose different RPN formulations
introducing innovative coefficients and parameters in order to
overcome the duplicate issue and the same importance of O,
S and D problem. The introduction of new parameters and/or
corrective factors consists in equations harder to compute
than the multiplication in the old RPN concept.
These additional terms are usually difficult to evaluate,
therefore the benefits obtained with this kind of alternative
RPNs are not enough to justify this increase of the analytical
computation.
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TABLE 2. Comparison between different alternative risk priority numbers.
FIGURE 4. Histogram of all the possible values of URPN(e).
FIGURE 5. Histogram of all the possible values of LRPN(e).
D. LOGARITHM
The application of logarithm in the classical RPN equation
compress the scale of possible RPN to a 0-3 range (if base-
10 is used), as shown in Fig 5.
LRPN = log (O · S · D) (5)
The logarithmic RPN reduces the dispersion and the
‘‘holes’’ in the scale, but it has no effects on duplicates issue
and on the importance of the three factors. For these reasons
it is not an optimal method and in literature there is not any
documentation that applies this equation on real system.
E. COMPARISON
The associated statistics of different alternative Risk Priority
Numbers (e.g. mean, median, minimum value and maximum
value) were evaluated and included in table 2. The table also
includes the maximum repetition frequency of a single risk
value (called ‘‘Most frequency’’), the number of different
unique values and the percentage of unique values, consid-
ering that the possible different combinations of three factors
expressed in 10-scale is 103.
The IRPN proposed by Braband and Griebel [15] and
Braband [16] is characterized by a very compressed range
from 3 to 30, with mean value and median coincident with
themidpoint of the range. These parameters highlight that this
method can easily overcome the ‘‘holes’’ and the dispersion
issues. At the same time, the duplicate problem is amplified,
as it is clearly identified considering that the percentage
number of unique values is only 2.8% comparing to the 12%
of the classical RPN. Indeed, it is characterized by the highest
‘‘most frequency’’, representing the main problem related to
this approach.
Quite the opposite, ERPN and URPN solve very well the
duplicates drawback with the maximum repetition frequen-
cies of 6 and 4 respectively, and the related percentages of
unique values of 22% and 42% respectively. In spite of these
advantages, both these methods have a limited use because
of the range of possible values that is extremely broadened.
Indeed, the mean value and the median of ERPN and URPN
are shifted toward high numbers, producing results very dif-
ficult to interpret.
The logarithmic RPN is characterized by a very com-
pressed and dense scale with the same number of unique
values of the classical RPN. The worst issue of this method is
the shape of the distribution, that is moved toward the highest
values of the range (i.e. on the right side of the plot), as it
is possible to see in figure 5. The statistical demonstration
of this sentence is provided by the LRPN median, that is
the only value in the column higher than the midpoint of the
range. In this case, the shape of the distribution and the high
median value make the definition of the RPN threshold very
challenging, because lots of RPN are concentrated in the final
section of the range.
Finally, table 2 highlights that all the alternative approaches
proposed above have advantages and disadvantages, and no
one can solve at the same time all the RPN drawbacks without
introducing other limitations. Therefore, in many real cases,
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TABLE 3. Comparison between different alternative risk priority numbers using a 1 to 5 scale.
the classical RPN is still suitable, and the choice of alternative
method depend on the analytical cost that a company can
support.
IV. SCALE ADJUSTMENT
Many papers [27]–[31] suggest to reduce the number of O,
S and D levels because in many applications it is difficult to
evaluate the parameters in ten different levels. According to
these works, the choice of only 5 levels is optimal in several
manufacturing fields. The standard IEC 60812 – 2006 [32]
proposed a ten levels approach and a reference guide to how
assess these values. The 2018 new version of the standard [4]
revises the reference guide table and it lets the designers
free to assign the O, S and D values personalizing the own
tables.
For instance, the assessment of the occurrence rank is
strictly related to the item failure rate and usually the fail-
ure rates of the components that make up a generic system
varying in few orders of magnitude. Therefore, the use of a
5 or less different occurrence values is recommended in order
to cover the failure rates range in an optimal way.
The consequences of a failure mode influence the severity
assessment. In many applications it is not possible to define
ten different levels of failure consequences, therefore the
severity ranks are merged in sublevels with two or three
individual level together. The same considerations are valid
also for the detection range because usually the diagnostic
information is not completely available during the design
phase. For these reasons, a 5 or less levels evaluation is
optimal also for severity and detection.
Table 3 compares the application of a scale adjustment
on the classical RPN and on the alternative Risk Priority
Numbers proposed above. Obviously, the identification of
just 5 different values mitigates the duplicate issue, as it is
possible to see comparing the percentages of unique values
in table 2 and table 3. Two examples of the application of a
1-5 scale of the O, S and D parameters for classical RPN and
for IRPN are illustrated respectively in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.
ERPN and URPN using 1 to 5 scale are both the best
solutions in term of duplicate issues, but the range of possible
values has little significance even in this case, as it is possible
to see in Fig. 8 in case of the URPN(e) approaches is applied
FIGURE 6. Histogram of all the possible values of RPN using a 1-5 scale
of the O, S and D parameter.
FIGURE 7. Histogram of all the possible values of IRPN using a 1-5 scale
of the O, S and D parameter.
using a reduced scale. In general, all the proposed approaches
maintain each related drawback, but the adjustment of the
scale using only five different values allow to mitigate these
limits, making every technique more suitable for industrial
and manufacturing applications.
V. FUZZY AND MULTI-CRITERIA APPROACHES
To overcome the above drawbacks, fuzzy logic has been
widely applied in Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality
Analysis [33]. Vast majority of fuzzy FMECA approaches
employs fuzzy if–then rules for prioritization of failure
modes [34]–[37]. This requires a vast amount of expert
knowledge and expertise.
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FIGURE 8. Histogram of all the possible values of URPN(e) using a
1-5 scale of the O, S and D parameter.
FIGURE 9. Example of membership functions for severity assessment.
The idea is to represent O, S, and D using linguis-
tic variables and rank them using fuzzy numbers (e.g.,
triangular or trapezoidal fuzzy numbers) instead of crisp
numbers [38], [39]. To do that, the first step is to define
membership functions for the three risk factors O, S, and D
as shown in figure 9, that is an example of fuzzy assessment
for severity S index.
Once membership functions are defined, each risk factor
can be represented by linguistic variables. After that, expert
judgment can be collected regarding the three risk factors in
the form of linguistic terms. These linguistic terms are inte-
grated in the fuzzy rule base to produce linguistic term repre-
senting the RPN [40]–[42]. In particular, a complete if–then
rule base may consist of hundreds of rules, where ‘‘If’’ refers
to an antecedent that is compared to the inputs, and ‘‘Then’’
refers to a consequent, which is the result/output [43]–[45].
It is absolutely not realistic to ask an expert to make hundreds
of judgments. Moreover, this approach has a very high level
of subjectivity during the rule definition phase, that is a
contradiction because the fuzzy theory is generally used to
mitigate the subjectivity of O, S and D definition.
Instead of using fuzzy if–then rules, some papers propose
to combine fuzzy and other approaches to prioritize failure
modes in FMECA [46]–[50].
Most works in literature also propose the support of
Multi-criteria decision methods (MCDM) to carry out
FMECA [51]–[53]. Braglia [54] proposes the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) to pairwise compare the potential
causes of failure by assuming as criteria O, S and D together
with the expected cost due to failures. Braglia et al. [55]
develop a fuzzy criticality assessment model that present
a risk function where if-then fuzzy rules are automatically
generated. To take into account the uncertainty that often
occurs in the evaluation of O, S, and D, the authors pro-
pose the fuzzy-technique for order preference by similarity
to ideal solution (FTOPSIS) [56]. A combined FTOPSIS
and fuzzy-AHP approach to FMECA is proposed by Kutlu
and Ekmekçioğlu [57]. The fuzzy-AHP method is applied to
weight the risk factors that are successively used within the
FTOPSIS approach to obtain the final closeness coefficients
on the basis of which failure modes are prioritized. Carpitella
et al. [51] proposes a decision support tool, based on FTOP-
SIS and AHP, to perform a reliability analysis with relation
to a subsystem, in which the process of eliciting judgments
from experts did not contemplate a consensus obtained from
a modeling of the differing decision-making power of each
expert.
These modern techniques solve many RPN problems
(see Table 1) using different analytical models, but usually
introduce a complexity and a computational cost that may
not be suitable for many companies. In particular, Fuzzy and
Multi-Criteria approaches are extremely effective and power-
ful solutions, especially to solve the subjectivity problem and
the relative importance of O, S and D. Despite of these advan-
tages, this paper aim is to analyze the alternative methods
that save the nature of the classical formula expressed by the
standard IEC60812 considering only a simple combination of
O, S and D without introducing other mathematical theory.
Therefore, the following paragraphs compare the alternative
RPNs, proposed in section III, on a real case.
VI. RISK ASSESSMENT FOR HVAC IN RAILWAY SYSTEMS
Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) is the tech-
nology of indoor and vehicular environmental comfort.
The objectives of HVAC systems are to provide an
acceptable level of occupancy comfort and process func-
tion, to maintain good indoor air quality, and to keep sys-
tem costs and energy requirements to a minimum [58]–[61].
With hundreds of commuters often crowded onto train car-
riages during peak hours, passenger comfort is a major
concern for operators around the world. While train car-
riages can mitigate some of the misery of overcrowding
with good design and punctual service, an efficient heating,
ventilation and air conditioning system (HVAC) is the best
way of regulating temperature and air quality on crowded
trains [62]–[64].
The HVAC systems used in railway application are com-
posed by several different components, the main ones are
included in the diagram in figure 10.
This study focuses on the failure modes, effects and criti-
cality analysis of some of the most critical components that
make up the HVAC: compressor, evaporator blower and air
flow detector.
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TABLE 4. Failure modes and effects analysis for HVAC in railway application.
The compressor draws in the cold gases exiting the evap-
orator battery at low pressure and compresses them, so it
comes out as gas at high pressure and overheated. The motor
compressor is fitted with an electromagnetic valve to vary the
capacity according to the demands of refrigeration load at any
time.
Blowers are used to compress the water vapor for the pur-
pose of raising its pressure and saturation temperature. This
produces the desired heat transfer in the main heat exchanger
for recycling the energy in the vapor, which greatly improves
energy efficiency.
Air flow detector, due to the interaction with the stream-
ing fluid, generates an electrically measurable signal for
determination of the total flow of the fluid. The air flow sensor
can alert to HVAC cooling system failures, or be used to
ensure there is air flow through the cabins all times.
A. RISK ASSESSMENT USING 1 TO 10 SCALE
A real case of Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
system was analyzed using FMECA in order to test and
validate the potentiality of the alternative RPNs proposed
above. Table 4 includes all the items failure modes, the causes
and the effects of each mode, the last one divided in ‘‘Local
effects’’ (i.e. effects on compressor), ‘‘Global effects’’ (i.e.
effects on the upper classification-level) and ‘‘Effects on
train’’ (i.e. effects on the global system).
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TABLE 5. Failure mode of HVAC in railway application ranked using classical and alternative risk priority numbers.
FIGURE 10. HVAC functional diagram.
The occurrence O, severity S and detection D of each mode
were provided by three reliability experts in order to quantita-
tively consider the criticality of the components and included
in table 5. According to the international standard [4] the
O, S and D parameters can assume value in the 1-10 scale,
the assessment follows the rules proposed in the standard.
The occurrence values are assessed considering the failure
rate of each failure mode (provided by the manufacturer),
while the failure effects influence the severity values. The
Detection is usually ranked in reverse order from the severity
or occurrence numbers; the higher the detection number, the
less likely the detection.
Table 5 is divided in six sections:
1) Occurrence, Severity and Detection assessment for
each failure mode;
2) Classical RPN assessment (‘‘value’’ column) and its
decreasing ordering of the modes (‘‘rank’’ column).
The highest is the rank the highest is the criticality
related to this failure mode;
3) IRPN assessment (‘‘value’’ column) and its decreasing
ordering of the modes (‘‘rank’’ column);
4) ERPN assessment using base x = 3 and identical
weights (set as 1) for the factors (‘‘value’’ column) and
its decreasing ordering of the modes (‘‘rank’’ column),
5) URPN assessment using z = e (‘‘value’’ column) and
its decreasing ordering of the modes (‘‘rank’’ column);
6) LRPN assessment (‘‘value’’ column) and its decreasing
ordering of the modes (‘‘rank’’ column);
The criticality assessment using the classical method leads
to RPN values which vary in the first half of the admissible
range (i.e. from 1 to 1000). The results are quite distant from
each other: this lead to an easy prioritization of themode from
the highest RPN (most critical) to the lowest (least critical).
A threshold value which distinguish the group of the most
dangerous modes from the set of the least critical one could
be identified comparing the data or by different mathematical
approaches [14], [65], [66].
The IRPN scores vary in a limited range, leading to two
main problems: item with the same values (e.g. Despite
different O, S and D index FM1, FM8 and FM9 have the
same IRPN = 21) and difficulty in the definition of a RPN
threshold rate due to a very compressed scale of admissible
results.
Both ERPN(3) and URPN(e) provide outcomes hardly
comparable with the classical formulation because of the
very wide admissible range. For the same reason the def-
inition of a RPN threshold value is very critical: the gap
between two high values is very large and the interpre-
tation of the criticality related to these numbers is quite
hard.
The LRPN is the only one that maintains the same priori-
tization ordering of the classical formulation. The results are
irrational numbers compressed in a very small range.
For this reason, also in this case the definition of a threshold
value is very critical.
Fig. 11 presents the results obtained from the analysis of
table 5 highlighting how the different approaches provide
different prioritization orders. The chart shows ten different
groups composed by five bars with different colors where
the groups stand for the analyzed failure mode, the colors
represent the different techniques and the height of the bars
identifies the criticality of the mode.
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FIGURE 11. Bar plot of the classical and alternative RPNs ranking for
each failure mode.
The height of a bar depends on the priority associated to
that mode with the specified method: the higher the bar and
more critical is the mode, therefore higher is the rank.
What is striking about Fig. 11 and table 5 is that the
different approaches provide different ordering despite they
consider the same O, S and D dataset. The most evident
finding to emerge from the IRPN analysis is the duplicate
issue, consequently the IRPN prioritization is meaningless
because it is impossible to distinguish the more critical modes
in presence of many identical values.
The ERPN amplifies the importance of higher values of O,
S and D; for instance, FM8 moves from the fourth rank in
the classical RPN prioritization to the second position in the
ERPN rank, due to the very high value of O and S. In some
circumstances, giving high priority to higher O, S and D
values could be positive. The disadvantages are evident when
only one value of O, S and D is close to 10: in this case the
exponential formulation of the higher parameter is dominant
making the other one negligible. The URPN amplifies the
importance only of the severity, therefore if the severity is
very high the mode will be definitely critical. For example,
using this method FM6, FM7 and FM8 have the maximum
priority because they are characterized by the highest severity
of the system (S = 8).
In summary, these results show that the most reasonable
prioritization order is the one provided by the classical Risk
Priority Number.
B. RISK ASSESSMENT USING 1 TO 5 SCALE
The occurrence O, severity S and detection D were evaluated
again considering a scale adjustment in order to test and
validate the advantages and disadvantages of the 1 to 5 scale
applied to the classical Risk Priority Number.
A new set-rule was defined for the assessment of the
criticality indices of the failure mode included in table 4. The
new O, S and D score are collected in table 6, while table 7
include a comparison between the results of the classical RPN
assessment obtained using the standard scale and the reduced
scale.
The differences between the two scales assessment are
highlighted in Table 7. As the table shows, there is not a
TABLE 6. O, S and D assessment for the failure mode of HVAC in railway
application using 1 to 5 scale.
TABLE 7. Comparison of the ranks using 1 to 5 scale and 1 to 10 scale
applied to classical risk priority number.
significant difference between the rank provided by the two
approaches. There are only two small differences between the
two data-set:
a The rank of the failure modes FM4 and FM10 are
inverted: using the 1-10 scale FM4 and FM10 are
the 7th and the 10th most critical modes respectively,
instead the rank are swapped when the 1-5 scale are
used.
b The failure modes FM1 and FM8 are characterized by
the same RPN when the 1-5 scale are used: it results in
two modes with the same rank.
The difference a) is negligible because affect two modes
characterized by low Risk Priority Number. In fact, FM4 and
FM10 are considered not critical mode, therefore the differ-
ence in the rank provided by the two approaches is not sig-
nificant. Quite the opposite, the difference b) is very relevant
because highlights that the scale reduction could involves in
a duplicates problem.
This result is somewhat counterintuitive. The most sur-
prising aspect of this difference is that the percentage of
unique value using the 1-5 scale is doubled respect to use the
1-10 scale. Theoretically, reducing the scale, the number of
duplicates decrease. Actually, the use of a small scale involves
more duplicates in the O, S and D assessment, consequently
the possibility of a duplicate in RPN evaluation increase.
92406 VOLUME 7, 2019
L. Ciani et al.: Critical Comparison of Alternative RPNs in FMECA
FIGURE 12. Bar plot of the RPN ranking using 1-10 scale and 1-5 scale for
each failure mode.
FIGURE 13. Bar plot of the relative Risk Priority Number obtained using
the classical RPN approach and the 1-5 scale RPN.
The probability of a duplicate generated by the same
combination of O, S, D increases using 1-5 scale while the
probability of a duplicate generated by different combination
of O, S, D decreases.
Taken together, these results suggest that there is a benefit
in the use of a reduced scale in term of unique values, but
it is very important to pay specific attention to the Occur-
rence, Severity and Detection assessment in order to cover
the complete admissible range of the parameter and reduce
the possibility of a duplicate in the Risk Priority Number.
The results obtained in table 7 are summarized in Fig. 12,
using a bar plot illustrating ten different groups composed by
two bars with different colors where the groups stand for the
analyzed failure modes, the blue bar represents the 1-10 scale
assessment and the red bar stands for the 1-5 scale evaluation.
The higher the bar, higher is the rank associated to that mode
(i.e more critical is the failure modes).
Fig. 13 shows another comparison of the Risk Priority
Numbers obtained in the previous assessments, where the
height of the bars stands for the relative RPN, expressed as the
ratio between the Risk Priority Number of that mode divided
by the maximum RPN of the analysis.
Considering the critical failure mode (i.e. the mode char-
acterized by high relative RPN) no significant differences
were found between the two approaches. Quite the opposite,
analyzing the modes with low Risk Priority Number there
was a significant difference between the two method. This
means that, in proportion, the reduced scale affects more the
assessment of the lower RPNs compared to the higher RPNs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The aim of the present research was to examine the different
approaches presented in literature regarding the evaluation of
alternative risk priority numbers. Several methods currently
exist for the assessment of the criticality of modes during
a FMECA. These alternative approaches try to compensate
the multiple issues related to the classical RPN interpretation,
such as: holes, duplicates, dispersion etc.
The paper focuses on the techniques which do not intro-
duce additional corrective factors or do not completely distort
the formulation of the RPN with the introduction of new
analytical theory.
The analyzed approaches are: RPN, IRPN (consists of the
sum of O, S, D), ERPN (based on the exponentiation of O, S,
D), URPN (consists on the product of O, D and S as power)
and LRPN (based on the logarithm of the product of O, S, D).
The advantages and disadvantages of each techniques are
evaluated by using a chart of all the possible values obtained
combining O, S, D according to each procedure. This study
has identified that no one method succeeds to solve all the
issues and the solution of one problem involves the worsening
of the other drawbacks.
The previous methods are analyzed also considering a
reduced O, S, D scale from 1 to 5. This reduction does not
solve the problems but mitigates all of them, therefore it
represents a trade-off through easiness of implementation,
accuracy of results, flexibility to different application field,
solution of the issues.
Moreover, the work presents an overview regarding fuzzy
theory and multi-criteria approaches to solve some of the
RPN issues. These models allow the designers to mitigate
the subjectivity and the relative importance of the O, S and
D factors. Industrial companies objective is to achieve the
optimal result in the most time and cost effective way. There-
fore, fuzzy and multi-criteria approaches are not always very
suitable for industrial application even though they are a
powerful solution to identify the optimal rank of the failure
modes in term of criticality.
In order to test and validate these assumptions, a FMECA
was developed for the critical components of a HVAC system
used in railway applications. These results show that the RPN
is the most trustworthy equation because it provides the most
reasonable prioritization order of the failure modes.
The different approaches provide different orderings
despite they consider the same O, S and D dataset: the IRPN
includes many duplicates, the ERPN amplifies the impor-
tance of higher values of O, S and D and the URPN amplifies
the importance only of the severity.
Anyway, all themethods agree with themost critical failure
modes of the system: the electrical failure of the evaporator
blower (FM7).
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